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Alex Salmond and David Cameron’s incoherent referendum
plans mean that they are unlikely to get what they want for
either Scotland or the UK.
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An independence referendum is due to be held in Scotland in 2014, with another
referendum being pledged by UK Prime Minister David Cameron on the country’s
relationship with Europe in 2017. Jo Murkens and Peter Jones argue that in both
referendums the options put before the electorate are likely to be exceptionally vague. The
UK’s proposed new relationship with Europe is still largely unknown, and it is unclear what
the precise nature of an independent Scotland would involve.
Countries that are used to ref erendums on constitutional matters use them sparingly.
The UK has no such constitutional requirement, but f aces the possibility of  having to
deal with two such ref erendums within the space of  a f ew years. The f irst ref erendum
could see Scotland break away f rom the United Kingdom, the second could see the
United Kingdom(which by then may or may not include Scotland) break away f rom the
European Union.
The common issue to both Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, and UK Prime Minister
David Cameron, is polit ical sovereignty. They both want more of  it; Salmond wants to claim it f rom the
UK, Cameron wants to claim it f rom the EU. In that narrow sense, they are both nationalists: Salmond a
Scottish one, Cameron a Brit ish one. Both also want, they claim, to be good European cit izens but have
to contend with the problem that the European club they want to be members of  has rules which conf lict
with their visions of  the idealised version they imagine it should be. And the promotion of  this idealised
vision to their voters leads them both to polit ical posit ions which are incoherent.
Scotland’s diff icult  road towards independence and EU membership
For the Scottish National Party (SNP) which
Sco tland ’s First Ministe r Ale x Salmo nd  and  UK Prime  Ministe r David
Came ro n Cre d it: Sco ttish Go ve rnme nt (Cre ative  Co mmo ns BY NC)
For the Scottish National Party (SNP) which
was, until the advent of  devolution in 1999, a
minority f ringe party, the ‘Independence in
Europe’ policy was never subjected to serious
examination. It was not much more than a
polit ical slogan used in polit ical debate to
counter the separatist charge levelled by
opponents. The most that was done to
develop this policy was to locate sympathetic
European luminaries who gave the SNP helpf ul
quotes asserting that upon
independence,Scotland would move
seamlessly into EU membership. It became an
article of  SNP f aith that Scotland would be
warmly welcomed into the happy European
f amily, ef f ectively countering ‘separatist’
accusations. So cemented into SNP ideology is
this belief  that Nicola Sturgeon, deputy f irst
minister, told the Scottish Parliament’s
European and external relations committee in
December 2007: ‘It is the clear view of  the
Scottish National Party and the [Scottish]
government that Scotland would automatically
be a member of  the European Union upon
independence.’
The automaticity proposition f ounders on the rather obvious point that while the people and territory of
Scotland may already be in the EU, the Scottish government is not. And the Scottish government being in
the EU requires its votes in the European Council and other entit lements to be written into EU treaties,
which can only be done with the unanimous consent of  all other member states. This remains the case.
The SNP, however, ref uses to acknowledge this point because it raises the vision of  Scotland being
outside the EU and having to bang on the door begging to be allowed in out of  the cold, bringing the
separatist bogey back into play.
The battle against the separatist charge has had to be f ought on another f ront – within the UK.
Unionists have alleged that independence will mean that f amilies with members on either side of  the
border will become f ragmented, that they and commercial trade will have to negotiate border controls at
Berwick and Gretna Green, that Scotland will lose access to popular BBC shows such as East Enders
and Strictly Come Dancing and so on. To counter this, the SNP has devised a new strategy – that while
the polit ical union of  the UK will come to an end, the social and civil union will continue and prosper. Thus
f amilies will be just as united and able to jointly celebrate such things as the Queen’s birthdays and
anniversaries as she will still be the titular head of  state in an independent Scotland.
Harsh economic realit ies, however, have f orced the extension of  this sof t unionism into harder areas.
The stresses and strains that the euro is under have made it as unattractive to Scots as it is to the
English. The SNP decided some time ago that it would stick with sterling as its currency until such time as
there are economic benef its to joining the euro, which would only occur af ter a ref erendum. As some 60
per cent of  Scottish trade is with the rest of  the UK, it makes litt le sense to erect a currency barrier to
that trade while tearing one down to benef it the 20 per cent of  Scottish trade that is with the Eurozone.
The travails of  the euro and the proposed deeper integration remedies, however, demonstrate that such
a currency union would erode Scotland’s f iscal independence. Proposed tax changes and government
budgets would have to come under the tutelage of  the (by then) f oreign institutions of  the UK Treasury
and the Bank of  England. Various unionist polit icians, such as Treasury chief  secretary Danny Alexander
and f ormer chancellor Alistair Darling, have argued either that the UK government simply could not
countenance such an arrangement, or that the arrangements would be so restrictive as to nullif y the
claimed gains f rom polit ical independence.
The SNP’s counter to this has been to assert a rather crude truth, that as sterling is a f ully tradeable
currency, the UK cannot stop Scotland f rom unilaterally adopting the pound. This, however, looks
unsatisf actory f rom the point of  view of  independence. It leaves monetary policy, the determination of
interest rates, and the operation of  quantitative easing in the Bank of  England’s hands. The SNP also
claim, rather more vaguely, that the f iscal stability pact necessary f or a currency union need not be so
restrictive when, in f act, the lesson of  EU struggles to stabilise the euro point to t ighter rather than
looser centralised f iscal controls.
This puts Salmond in the odd posit ion of  being, simultaneously, a Scottish nationalist, a European
f ederalist, and a Brit ish unionist. He wants Scotland to have untrammelled use of  its own credit card to
dine at the same time in the Brit ish and European restaurants, but ref uses the table d’hôte menu and
insists on picking f rom two à la carte menus, which neither chef s seem willing to of f er.
David Cameron is asking the impossible of Europe
Cameron is in only a slightly less strange place. He wants to trade heavily on his Brit ish nationalism with
his domestic audience, but waves his European unionism when on the other side of  the English Channel.
Both audiences are, however, able to see what is being presented to the other and thus he runs the high
risk of  undermining his message to one by his contrary calls to the other.
In his much publicised speech on 23 January 2013, David Cameron set out his intention to renegotiate
the UK’s relationship with the EU and put the terms of  that changed membership to the Brit ish people in
an ‘in/out’ ref erendum by the end of  2017, subject to the Conservatives winning an outright majority in
the general elections in 2015. His speech received global attention and a mixture of  praise (e.g. those
who agreed that the EU ‘needs to be ref ormed’) and crit icism (e.g. those who disagreed with the
‘language of  unilateral negotiations and the threat of  withdrawal’). Much of  the commentary, indeed much
of  the speech itself , is based on the dubious premise that the UK is a major player in the European
Union.
On one level, the UK undoubtedly sits at the top table: it has the third largest population and the third
largest economy in the EU. However, the UK already has a dif f erent relationship with the EU than the
other member states. It gets a signif icant rebate on its f inancial contributions to the EU budget; it has
external borders with other EU member states; it has its own currency; it did not sign the f iscal stability
treaty which requires budget prudence and introduces a debt brake f or the 17 Eurozone states; and it will
not (unlike 11 Eurozone states) impose a f inancial transaction tax which is designed to discourage
speculative trading. Moreover, the UK limited the applicability of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights and
the way in which it may be interpreted. And its red- lines approach at the IGC in 2007 means that the UK
can itself  decide (by 31 May 2014) whether to implement all the European measures on police and justice
(which will be subject to the jurisdiction of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union) or whether to opt
out of  all the measures and then adopt individual measures on an ad hoc basis (subject to the consent
of  the other member states). Although how exactly the latter option ‘cuts red tape’ is anyone’s guess.
If  this isn’t à la carte, then what is? What more does Cameron want to renegotiate? No one knows, and
no one has yet produced a checklist, although the government will be working on one until the autumn of
2014. For the time being, the Working Time Directive, the European Arrest Warrant, and a better deal on
f isheries keep coming up in debate. Is it realistic to argue that powers in those areas can be returned to
the member states? The practical options are the f ollowing. Either the UK tries to tackle the matter f rom
above by reducing the law-making powers of  the EU institutions (that option would require a treaty
change and the unanimous agreement of  the other member states which is, currently, unrealistic). Or the
UK tries to negotiate a better ‘deal’ f or itself  (e.g. through opt outs and protocols that are attached to
the Treaty). But is it credible that the other member states would grant the UK special treatment when
every member state is subject to aspects of  EU law of  which it disapproves? Overall neither option
seems workable.
On a more f undamental level it seems baf f ling that Brit ish Euroscepticism would appear to hinge on a
handf ul of  powers that need to be ‘repatriated’. It doesn’t, and it is ludicrous to suggest that the
Europhobes in the Conservative party will be placated if  junior doctors work longer, and UK nationals
who are wanted on charges abroad cannot be extradited (whereas, of  course, UK nationals who have
committed a crime in the UK but f led to another EU member state will immediately be brought back home).
On f ishing, where the real issue is depleted stocks through overf ishing, the Commission is already
transf erring decision-making powers to the member states in an attempt to decentralise f ishing policy
and tailor it to local conditions. As Douglas Alexander put it: ‘The gap between the minimum the Tories will
demand and the maximum the EU could give is unbridgeable’. These are not the f undamental issues, and
any self - respecting Europhobe will not rest until the UK has exited the Union and re-attached itself  to
the single market like a dingy to a supertanker.
So if  Cameron’s speech does not stand up to scrutiny f rom a European perspective, maybe its intended
target was closer to home. Almost all f oreign and domestic observers noted that the speech was driven
primarily by domestic party polit icking (the United Kingdom Independence Party – UKIP) and internecine
party struggles (Bill Cash). Cameron is trying to unif y a f ractured party in the run-up to the general
elections in 2015, and UKIP and the Tory backbenchers f orced his hand. But even domestically Cameron
may have dealt himself  a bad hand. The of f er of  a ref erendum on renegotiated membership af ter the
next general election is subject to two unknowns: i) the outcome of  the 2015 elections; ii) the outcome
of  the negotiations. It is presently f ar f rom clear whether he will be successf ul with respect to either or
both.
Until then Cameron will be seeking, not so much nouvelle cuisine as cuisine impossible, just like Salmond:
untrammelled UK access to the European single market restaurant, ref usal of  the table d’hôte menu and
insistence on the à la carte menu which is not on of f er. And then he will have the nerve to ask f or a
rebate (i.e. other member states subsidising his dining) when presented with the bill.
Two Incoherent Policies
Cameron’s policy on the EU is just as incoherent as the SNP’s policy on continuing EU membership on
current terms. Cameron assumes he will win the next election, just as Alex Salmond assumes that
Scotland will automatically be an EU member state. Cameron claims that he can walk into the room and
negotiate a new deal. Salmond claims that he can secure Scotland’s place in Europe on current terms: i.e.
by inherit ing the UK’s opt outs on the euro currency and the Schengen f ree travel area, which is illusory.
Moreover, a ref erendum (if  one is to be had) needs to set out two clear choices bef orehand. The in/out
ref erendum on the EU or the Yes/No ref erendums on Scottish independence do not of f er suf f icient
alternatives. What will come af ter EU membership? A f ree trade (all pay and no say) agreement with the
EU like Norway? The Commonwealth? The USA? NAFTA? The global market? Splendid isolation?
Likewise, Salmond promises continuity when any EU lawyer, polit ician, and bureaucrat will tell him that
there is no automatic right to membership of  the European Union. So, what if  membership is not
automatic? Will Scotland stay outside the EU? Have its application f ast- tracked? Join the queue of
applicant states? He also promises currency continuity within a skeletonised Brit ish union, when there
are an array of  economists and Treasury polit icians past and present saying it either will not work, or will
render the gaining of  polit ical independence pointless. So what will happen then? Freelance use of  the
pound? Enf orced joining of  the euro? Invention of  a Scottish currency?
The à la carte menus of f ered by both are, in reality, a dog’s dinner.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
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